Supplementary Online Material: Appendix

Legislature Integration and Bipartisanship: A Natural Experiment in Iceland

Contents

A Appendix Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Legislative Productivity in the *Althingi*



Source: http://www.althingi.is/ [Link]

Figure A2: An MP Draws Her Seat Number for 2013-14

Figure A3: Information Overload With Voting in the *Althingi*



Notes: This figure visualizes the number of votes taken per day on all days with at least one vote for each regular session from 1991-92 to 2017-18. The gaps reflect special and short sessions and periods when the *Althingi* was not in session. 36,366 votes were taken during the period shown.

Table A1: Pair-Level Balance Table

		Same...				Difference in...			
	Neighbor (t-1)	Gender	Ever Minister	Committee (t-1)	Constit.	Age	Sessions Experience	Wages (t-1)	Expenses (t-1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Neighbor × Different Party	.0069	-.0098	-.0066	-.0023	-.0025	-.0099	.16	-376288	-44906
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.56]	[.55]	[.51]	[.87]	[.79]	[.96]	[.43]	[.071]*	[.62]
	{.39}	{.54}	{.52}	{.86}	{.86}	{.96}	{.39}	{.027}**	{.49}
Neighbor × Same Party	-.017	.024	.0076	.012	.011	.57	.11	133811	-262
	[.15]	[.2]	[.66]	[.66]	[.53]	[.22]	[.81]	[.69]	[1]
	{.24}	{.42}	{.73}	{.64}	{.58}	{.2}	{.79}	{.72}	{1}
Same = Different	[.14]	[.13]	[.54]	[.63]	[.49]	[.27]	[.93]	[.2]	[.68]
	{.13}	{.34}	{.59}	{.6}	{.58}	{.26}	{.91}	{.2}	{.82}
Observations	21954	35314	35314	35314	35314	35314	35314	13579	13579
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.034	.54	.73	.6	.15	10	7.6	3512167	1511681

Notes: The outcome in column (1) is a dummy variable equal to one if the two MPs in a pair were seating neighbors in the previous session (only for non-short/special sessions in same parliamentary term). Each outcome in columns (2) to (5) is a dummy variable equal to one if the two MPs in a pair share the same value for the following variables: (2) dummy variable equal to one if MP is male, (3) dummy variable equal to one if ever held a ministerial position prior to this session, (4) dummy variable equal to one if chaired a committee at any point during the previous session, and (5) constituency. The outcomes in columns (6) to (9) are the absolute difference between the two MPs in a pair for the following variables: (6) age in years as of the start of the current session, (7) number of sessions since first session as Althingi member, (8) wages received in Althingi during the calendar year prior to the current session, and (9) expenses claimed in Althingi during the calendar year prior to the current session. The waves and expenses data are only available from session 136 (2008/9) onwards. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A2: MP-level Balance Table

	Proportion Oth-Party Neighbor (t-1) (1)	Male (2)	Age (3)	Reykjavik Constit. (4)	Ever Minister (5)	Committee (t-1) (6)	Sessions Experience (7)	Wages (t-1) (8)	Expenses (t-1) (9)
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor	-.0037	-.0042	.51	-.012	.0066	-.012	-.49	219539	23761
	(.037)	(.046)	(.93)	(.048)	(.036)	(.035)	(.79)	(683569)	(250630)
	[.92]	[.93]	[.58]	[.81]	[.85]	[.74]	[.53]	[.75]	[.92]
	{.92}	{.93}	{.53}	{.79}	{.84}	{.77}	{.48}	{.69}	{.92}
Observations	924	1420	1420	1420	1420	1420	1420	536	536
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.76	.64	49	.31	.17	.27	8.6	2968661	1119860

Notes: Outcome variables are: (1) proportion other-party neighbor in previous session (only for non-short/special sessions in same parliamentary term), (2) dummy variable equal to one if MP is male, (3) age in years as of the start of the current session, (4) dummy variable equal to one if elected from Reykjavik constituency (North or South from session 129 (2003) onwards), (5) dummy variable equal to one if ever held a ministerial position prior to this session, (6) dummy variable equal to one if chaired a committee at any point during the previous session, (7) number of sessions since first session as Althingi member. The outcomes for columns (8) and (9) are, respectively, the wages received, and other expenses claimed in Althingi during the calendar year prior to the current session, with the data for these variables only available from session 136 (2008/9) onwards. Proportion Other-Party Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different party. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A3: Pair-Level Balance Table: Coalition Heterogeneity

	Same...					Difference in...			
	Neighbor (t-1)	Gender	Ever Minister	Committee (t-1)	Constit.	Age	Sessions Experience	Wages (t-1)	Expenses (t-1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Neighbor × Different Coalition	-.00082	-.0074	.0054	.00035	-.0064	-.17	.1	-204889	-51900
	[.94]	[.68]	[.69]	[.98]	[.64]	[.57]	[.69]	[.47]	[.69]
	{.93}	{.71}	{.67}	{.98}	{.68}	{.56}	{.7}	{.36}	{.57}
Neighbor × Same Coalition	.0028	.0031	-.012	.0016	.0072	.41	.19	-355686	-22256
	[.83]	[.86]	[.27]	[.92]	[.52]	[.089]*	[.49]	[.13]	[.83]
	{.79}	{.87}	{.42}	{.91}	{.62}	{.17}	{.48}	{.1}	{.8}
Same = Different	[.8]	[.63]	[.38]	[.96]	[.46]	[.17]	[.84]	[.69]	[.85]
	{.81}	{.71}	{.43}	{.96}	{.53}	{.2}	{.84}	{.64}	{.85}
Observations	21954	35314	35314	35314	35314	35314	35314	13579	13579
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.034	.54	.73	.6	.15	10	7.6	3512167	1511681

Notes: The outcome in column (1) is a dummy variable equal to one if the two MPs in a pair were seating neighbors in the previous session (only for non-short/special sessions in same parliamentary term). Each outcome in columns (2) to (5) is a dummy variable equal to one if the two MPs in a pair share the same value for the following variables: (2) dummy variable equal to one if MP is male, (3) dummy variable equal to one if ever held a ministerial position prior to this session, (4) dummy variable equal to one if chaired a committee at any point during the previous session, and (5) constituency. The outcomes in columns (6) to (9) are the absolute difference between the two MPs in a pair for the following variables: (6) age in years as of the start of the current session, (7) number of sessions since first session as Althingi member, (8) wages received in Althingi during the calendar year prior to the current session, and (9) expenses claimed in Althingi during the calendar year prior to the current session. The waves and expenses data are only available from session 136 (2008/9) onwards. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Coalition is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same coalition for that session. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A4: MP-level Balance Table: Coalition Heterogeneity

	Proportion Oth-Party Neighbor (t-1) (1)	Male (2)	Age (3)	Reykjavik Constit. (4)	Ever Minister (5)	Committee (t-1) (6)	Sessions Experience (7)	Wages (t-1) (8)	Expenses (t-1) (9)
Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor	-.0067	-.036	.11	.036	-.018	.026	.13	-129312	-197475
	(.037)	(.037)	(.73)	(.037)	(.029)	(.032)	(.59)	(516001)	(235432)
	[.86]	[.33]	[.88]	[.33]	[.54]	[.42]	[.83]	[.8]	[.4]
	{.84}	{.33}	{.85}	{.3}	{.5}	{.37}	{.8}	{.78}	{.33}
Observations	924	1420	1420	1420	1420	1420	1420	536	536
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.49	.64	49	.31	.17	.27	8.6	2968661	1119860

Notes: Outcome variables are: (1) proportion other-party neighbor in previous session (only for non-short/special sessions in same parliamentary term), (2) dummy variable equal to one if MP is male, (3) age in years as of the start of the current session, (4) dummy variable equal to one if elected from Reykjavik constituency (North or South from session 129 (2003) onwards), (5) dummy variable equal to one if ever held a ministerial position prior to this session, (6) dummy variable equal to one if chaired a committee at any point during the previous session, (7) number of sessions since first session as Althingi member. The outcomes for columns (8) and (9) are, respectively, the wages received, and other expenses claimed in Althingi during the calendar year prior to the current session, with the data for these variables only available from session 136 (2008/9) onwards. Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different coalition. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A5: Do Front-Back Neighbors Vote More Alike Too?

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)	
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)
Neighbor × Different Party	.0051	.007
	{.057}*	{.01}**
Neighbor × Same Party	.0038	.0039
	{.56}	{.55}
Front-Back Neighbor × Different Party	-.00059	-.00072
	{.85}	{.83}
Front-Back Neighbor × Same Party	.0051	.0065
	{.52}	{.43}
Observations	35259	35259
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y

Notes: Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Front-Back Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are sitting immediately in front of or behind each other. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A6: Pair-Level Effects on Bipartisan Voting: Effects with Undivided Attention

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance (3)	Similarity (4)	Compliance (5)	Similarity (6)
Neighbor × Corner	.013	.013	.0043	.0013	-.012	-.012
	[.046]**	[.041]**	[.68]	[.9]	[.19]	[.16]
	{.092}*	{.079}*	{.59}	{.88}	{.14}	{.14}
Neighbor × Middle	.0024	.0047	.0012	.0014	.0045	.0043
	[.42]	[.084]*	[.81]	[.79]	[.19]	[.24]
	{.45}	{.16}	{.78}	{.75}	{.29}	{.31}
Corner = Middle	[.14]	[.24]	[.79]	[.99]	[.07]*	[.06]*
	{.2}	{.31}	{.75}	{.99}	{.085}*	{.072}*
Observations	22652	22652	14140	14140	13863	13863
Session × Corner FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Session × Party Pair FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.56	2.5	.54	2.5	.55	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.13	.16	.12	.15	.12	.15

Notes: Regressions include different-party dyads only, with neither MP pre-assigned seats. Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Corner is equal to one if at least one MP in pair has only one seating neighbor. Middle is equal to one minus Corner. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A7: Pair-Level Effects: Voting Similarity without Absenteeism

	Compliance	Yes-Yes/No-No/Abstain-Abstain		
	All	All	Below 50th	Below 25th
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: Contemporaneous Effect (t)			
Neighbor × Different Party	.0051	.0033	.0061	.0033
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.057]*	[.27]	[.034]**	[.27]
	{.057}*	{.2}	{.022}**	{.2}
Neighbor × Same Party	.0036	.0025	.0021	.0025
	[.57]	[.77]	[.81]	[.77]
	{.58}	{.72}	{.78}	{.72}
Observations	35259	35259	35205	35259
	Panel B: One Year Later (t+1)			
Neighbor × Different Party	.0008	-.00048	-.0051	-.00048
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.86]	[.93]	[.34]	[.93]
	{.81}	{.88}	{.14}	{.88}
Neighbor × Same Party	.011	.0052	.013	.0052
	[.19]	[.61]	[.25]	[.61]
	{.13}	{.56}	{.16}	{.56}
Observations	21589	21589	21589	21589
	Panel C: Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)			
Neighbor × Different Party	.0013	.0001	-.00013	.0001
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.68]	[.98]	[.97]	[.98]
	{.73}	{.98}	{.96}	{.98}
Neighbor × Same Party	.0044	.0029	.0043	.0029
	[.59]	[.77]	[.71]	[.77]
	{.57}	{.75}	{.65}	{.75}
Observations	21638	21638	21638	21638
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.57	.49	.33	.49
Outcome S.d.	.13	.17	.17	.17

Notes: Each panel shows the estimates from four linear regressions. Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Yes-Yes/No-No/Abstain-Abstain is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair both vote yes, or both vote no, or both abstain in a given session. Below 50th/25th votes are votes in which the share of MPs voting the modal vote is less than the median/25th percentile among all votes. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. Outcome Mean and Standard Deviation are for the sample included in the Panel A regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A8: Pair-Level Effects: Voting Similarity without Absenteeism and Abstention

	Compliance	Yes-Yes/No-No		
	All	All	Below 50th	Below 25th
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: Contemporaneous Effect (t)			
Neighbor × Different Party	.0051	.0034	.0058	.0034
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.057]*	[.25]	[.045]**	[.25]
	{.057}*	{.19}	{.027}**	{.19}
Neighbor × Same Party	.0036	.0012	-6.2e-06	.0012
	[.57]	[.88]	[1]	[.88]
	{.58}	{.86}	{1}	{.86}
Observations	35259	35259	35205	35259
	Panel B: One Year Later (t+1)			
Neighbor × Different Party	.0008	-.00012	-.0042	-.00012
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.86]	[.98]	[.42]	[.98]
	{.81}	{.98}	{.22}	{.98}
Neighbor × Same Party	.011	.0032	.01	.0032
	[.19]	[.74]	[.35]	[.74]
	{.13}	{.71}	{.25}	{.71}
Observations	21589	21589	21589	21589
	Panel C: Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)			
Neighbor × Different Party	.0013	.000081	-.00016	.000081
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.68]	[.98]	[.96]	[.98]
	{.73}	{.98}	{.95}	{.98}
Neighbor × Same Party	.0044	.0033	.0045	.0033
	[.59]	[.73]	[.68]	[.73]
	{.57}	{.71}	{.61}	{.71}
Observations	21638	21638	21638	21638
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.57	.48	.31	.48
Outcome S.d.	.13	.17	.17	.17

Notes: Each panel shows the estimates from four linear regressions. Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Yes-Yes/No-No is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair both vote yes or both vote no in a given session. Below 50th/25th votes are votes in which the share of MPs voting the modal vote is less than the median/25th percentile among all votes. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. Outcome Mean and Standard Deviation are for the sample included in the Panel A regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A9: Pair-Level Effects on Voting: Robustness

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)				
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance 3-Cat (3)	Similarity 3-Cat (4)	Similarity Recode (5)
Neighbor × Different Party	.0051	.0071	.0057	.0062	.01
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.057]*	[.0047]***	[.022]**	[.0096]***	[.052]*
	{.057}*	{.009}***	{.037}**	{.022}**	{.057}*
Neighbor × Same Party	.0036	.0037	.0032	.0033	.0069
	[.57]	[.57]	[.58]	[.57]	[.56]
	{.58}	{.57}	{.62}	{.61}	{.59}
Same = Different	[.82]	[.61]	[.68]	[.63]	[.8]
	{.84}	{.65}	{.73}	{.69}	{.84}
Observations	35259	35259	35259	35259	35259
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.57	2.5	.59	1.6	2.2
Outcome S.d.	.13	.17	.13	.13	.25

Notes: The first two columns replicate the core results of Table 1. Compliance 3-Cat is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session, with absence considered equivalent to abstention. Similarity 3-Cat is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair, with absence considered equivalent to abstention. Similarity Recode is the pair-level average vote similarity, with absence coded as closer to a no vote than abstention. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A10: Pair-Level Effects on Contested Voting: Robustness

	Contemporaneous Effect (t), Below 50th				
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance 3-Cat (3)	Similarity 3-Cat (4)	Similarity Recode (5)
Neighbor × Different Party (proximity effect on bipartisanship)	.0096 [<0.001]*** {.006}***	.013 [<0.001]*** {.001}***	.01 [<0.001]*** {.002}***	.011 [<0.001]*** {.002}***	.02 [<0.001]*** {.003}***
Neighbor × Same Party	.0085 [.12] {.2}	.0096 [.12] {.17}	.0078 [.13] {.21}	.008 [.13] {.21}	.016 [.12] {.2}
Same = Different	[.84] {.9}	[.61] {.68}	[.68] {.78}	[.58] {.69}	[.7] {.79}
Observations	35205	35205	35205	35205	35205
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.46	2.3	.49	1.4	2
Outcome S.d.	.15	.32	.14	.19	.3

Notes: The first two columns replicate results from Table 2. Compliance 3-Cat is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session, with absence considered equivalent to abstention. Similarity 3-Cat is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair, with absence considered equivalent to abstention. Similarity Recode is the pair-level average vote similarity, with absence coded as closer to a no vote than abstention. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A11: Pair-Level Effects on Voting (Reweighted)

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance (3)	Similarity (4)	Compliance (5)	Similarity (6)
Neighbor × Different Party	.005	.0067	.0018	.0016	.000015	-.0001
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	(.0034)	(.004)	(.0046)	(.0047)	(.0042)	(.0046)
	[.14]	[.094]*	[.7]	[.73]	[1]	[.98]
	{.13}	{.043}**	{.68}	{.71}	{1}	{.98}
	<1>	<1>	<1>	<1>		
Neighbor × Same Party	.0032	.0033	.011	.0097	-.00091	-.0023
	(.0078)	(.0084)	(.0085)	(.0091)	(.0094)	(.0098)
	[.68]	[.69]	[.2]	[.29]	[.92]	[.81]
	{.63}	{.63}	{.18}	{.25}	{.89}	{.77}
	<1>	<1>	<1>	<1>		
Same = Different	[.81]	[.66]	[.32]	[.41]	[.92]	[.83]
	{.82}	{.65}	{.35}	{.42}	{.93}	{.83}
Observations	35259	35259	21589	21589	21638	21638
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.57	2.5	.55	2.5	.57	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.13	.17	.12	.16	.12	.16

Notes: Observations are weighted by the block-level inverse probability of treatment assignment, following Gerber and Green (2012). Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Dyadic-robust standard errors are in parentheses and dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Sharpened q-values (Anderson 2008) for non-placebo tests are in <>. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A12: Pair-Level Effects: Voting on Contested Votes (Reweighted)

	Below 50th Votes		Below 25th Votes	
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance (3)	Similarity (4)
	Panel A: Contemporaneous Effect (t)			
Neighbor × Different Party	.0092	.013	.005	.0067
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.0024]***	[<0.001]***	[.14]	[.096]*
	{.019}**	{.004}***	{.13}	{.043}**
	<.019>**	<.007>***	<.62>	<.62>
Neighbor × Same Party	.008	.0093	.0032	.0033
	[.22]	[.22]	[.68]	[.7]
	{.26}	{.23}	{.63}	{.63}
	<.62>	<.62>	<.78>	<.78>
Observations	35205	35205	35259	35259
	Panel B: One Year Later (t+1)			
Neighbor × Different Party	-.0019	-.0031	.0018	.0016
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.66]	[.54]	[.69]	[.73]
	{.68}	{.56}	{.68}	{.71}
	<.78>	<.78>	<.78>	<.78>
Neighbor × Same Party	.013	.011	.011	.0097
	[.14]	[.29]	[.19]	[.29]
	{.12}	{.22}	{.18}	{.25}
	<.62>	<.68>	<.62>	<.68>
Observations	21589	21589	21589	21589
	Panel C: Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)			
Neighbor × Different Party	.0017	.0025	.000015	-.0001
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.65]	[.6]	[1]	[.98]
	{.72}	{.61}	{1}	{.98}
Neighbor × Same Party	.0035	.0029	-.00091	-.0023
	[.71]	[.78]	[.92]	[.81]
	{.67}	{.75}	{.89}	{.77}
Observations	21638	21638	21638	21638
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.46	2.3	.57	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.15	.32	.13	.17

Notes: Each panel shows the estimates from four linear regressions. Observations are weighted by the block-level inverse probability of treatment assignment, following Gerber and Green (2012). Below 50th/25th votes are votes in which the share of MPs voting the modal vote is less than the median/25th percentile among all votes. Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Sharpened q-values (Anderson 2008) for non-placebo tests are in <>. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP

Table A13: Pair-Level Effects on Voting: Heterogeneity by Coalition

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance (3)	Similarity (4)	Compliance (5)	Similarity (6)
Neighbor × Different Coalition	.0079	.0093	.0067	.004	.0053	.0056
	(.0043)	(.0038)	(.0057)	(.0056)	(.004)	(.0037)
	[.066]*	[.014]**	[.24]	[.48]	[.19]	[.13]
	{.029}**	{.013}**	{.15}	{.37}	{.25}	{.2}
	<.3>	<.13>	<.92>	<1>		
Neighbor × Same Coalition	.0017	.0034	.00019	.00096	-.0011	-.0015
	(.0041)	(.0041)	(.0057)	(.0061)	(.0056)	(.0058)
	[.68]	[.41]	[.97]	[.87]	[.84]	[.8]
	{.66}	{.38}	{.97}	{.84}	{.83}	{.77}
	<1>	<1>	<1>	<1>		
Same = Different	[.33]	[.33]	[.43]	[.72]	[.42]	[.36]
	{.3}	{.3}	{.4}	{.67}	{.38}	{.33}
Observations	35259	35259	21589	21589	21638	21638
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.57	2.5	.55	2.5	.57	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.13	.17	.12	.16	.12	.16

Notes: Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Coalition is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same coalition for that session. Dyadic-robust standard errors are in parentheses and dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Sharpened q-values (Anderson 2008) for non-placebo tests are in <>. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A14: Pair-Level Effects on Contested Votes: Heterogeneity by Coalition

	Below 50th Votes		Below 25th Votes	
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance (3)	Similarity (4)
	Panel A: Contemporaneous Effect (t)			
Neighbor × Different Coalition	.0085	.01	.0079	.0093
	[.018]**	[.0028]***	[.069]*	[.015]**
	{.036}**	{.026}**	{.029}**	{.013}**
	<.054>*	<.022>**	<.14>	<.054>*
Neighbor × Same Coalition	.01	.014	.0017	.0034
	[.015]**	[.001]***	[.68]	[.4]
	{.03}**	{.005}***	{.66}	{.38}
	<.054>*	<.017>**	<1>	<.75>
Observations	35205	35205	35259	35259
	Panel B: One Year Later (t+1)			
Neighbor × Different Coalition	-.00044	-.0058	.0067	.004
	[.94]	[.36]	[.24]	[.47]
	{.92}	{.25}	{.15}	{.37}
	<1>	<.75>	<.51>	<.75>
Neighbor × Same Coalition	.0039	.005	.00019	.00096
	[.54]	[.47]	[.97]	[.87]
	{.48}	{.4}	{.97}	{.84}
	<.81>	<.75>	<1>	<1>
Observations	21589	21589	21589	21589
	Panel C: Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)			
Neighbor × Different Coalition	.0036	.0051	.0053	.0056
	[.39]	[.27]	[.19]	[.13]
	{.42}	{.32}	{.25}	{.2}
Neighbor × Same Coalition	.00024	-.00093	-.0011	-.0015
	[.97]	[.88]	[.85]	[.79]
	{.97}	{.87}	{.83}	{.77}
Observations	21638	21638	21638	21638
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.46	2.3	.57	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.15	.32	.13	.17

Notes: Each panel shows the estimates from four linear regressions. Below 50th/25th votes are votes in which the share of MPs voting the modal vote is less than the median/25th percentile among all votes. Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Sharpened q-values (Anderson 2008) for non-placebo tests are in <>. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. Same Coalition is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same coalition for that session. Outcome Mean and Standard Deviation are for the sample included in the Panel A regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A15: Pair-Level Effects by Vote Type

	Contemporaneous Effect (t) on Similarity				
	Bill	Amendment	Document	Resolution	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Neighbor × Different Party	.01	.0033	.0045	.013	.0073
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[<0.001]***	[.27]	[.12]	[.0042]***	[.011]**
	{.005}***	{.37}	{.17}	{.002}***	{.025}**
Neighbor × Same Party	.0061	.012	.0094	.0064	.016
	[.39]	[.18]	[.29]	[.49]	[.012]**
	{.36}	{.17}	{.23}	{.47}	{.032}**
Same = Different	[.58]	[.37]	[.6]	[.51]	[.25]
	{.62}	{.37}	{.58}	{.52}	{.31}
Observations	35205	35150	35151	35159	35256
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5
Percentage of All Votes	22	32	34	7	6

Notes: Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. The results are shown separately for voting on the four most common vote categories, plus a residual category. The four main categories are: draft bills, amendments, resolutions or parliamentary resolutions, and parliamentary documents. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A16: Pair-Level Effects by Bill Topic

	Contemporaneous Effect (t) on Similarity										
	Industry (1)	Foreign (2)	Economic (3)	Health (4)	Law (5)	Educ. (6)	Community (7)	Transport (8)	Admin. (9)	Religion (10)	Environ. (11)
Neighbor × Different Party	.019	.015	.016	.0045	.022	.011	.014	.0016	.015	.021	.019
	[<0.001]***	[.0036]***	[<0.001]***	[.64]	[.0016]***	[.35]	[.0055]***	[.87]	[.12]	[.48]	[.082]*
	{.003}***	{.092}*	{.007}***	{.69}	{.012}**	{.28}	{.042}**	{.86}	{.16}	{.41}	{.05}*
Neighbor × Same Party	.005	-.002	.0063	.019	.013	.0066	.015	.02	-.0076	.092	-.0048
	[.53]	[.9]	[.52]	[.22]	[.2]	[.7]	[.2]	[.09]*	[.67]	[.014]**	[.69]
	{.67}	{.91}	{.55}	{.33}	{.35}	{.7}	{.19}	{.26}	{.66}	{.026}**	{.78}
Same = Different	[.11]	[.32]	[.35]	[.48]	[.43]	[.83]	[.94]	[.18]	[.26]	[.17]	[.19]
	{.32}	{.38}	{.42}	{.54}	{.57}	{.84}	{.93}	{.37}	{.25}	{.14}	{.22}
Observations	22,090	21,995	22,093	21,631	21,896	20,459	21,943	20,464	21,696	10,642	22,024
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3
Percentage of All Bills	34	14	40	12	16	15	33	9.4	12	.79	14

Notes: Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. We include only the contested votes in which the share of MPs voting the modal vote is less than the median among all votes. The results are shown separately for voting on legislation belonging to the following categories: (1) Industry, (2) Foreign Relations, (3) Economic Management, (4) Health, (5) Law and Justice, (6) Education and Culture, (7) Community Issues, (8) Transport, (9) Administration and Local Governance, (10) Religion, and (11) Environment. Each piece of legislation may belong to more than one category (explaining why the percentage of all bills does not sum to 100%). Sample includes only 2001-02 session onwards as bill topic data only goes back to 2001-02. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A17: Is Influence Greater on Days With Many Votes?

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Similarity Busy (1)	Similarity Light (2)	Similarity Busy (3)	Similarity Light (4)	Similarity Busy (5)	Similarity Light (6)
Neighbor × Different Party	.007	.0082	-.0035	.0035	.00079	.00066
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.046]**	[<0.001]***	[.5]	[.51]	[.89]	[.86]
	{.12}	{.008}***	{.55}	{.4}	{.89}	{.89}
Neighbor × Same Party	.0086	.0019	.0013	.018	.00022	.0042
	[.4]	[.77]	[.92]	[.051]*	[.99]	[.55]
	{.42}	{.77}	{.91}	{.028}**	{.99}	{.59}
Same = Different	[.89]	[.33]	[.74]	[.17]	[.97]	[.69]
	{.87}	{.39}	{.76}	{.12}	{.97}	{.7}
Observations	35024	35207	21482	21543	21626	21589
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.24	.16	.23	.15	.23	.14

Notes: Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. The Busy measure considers only votes on days with at least 50 votes. The Light measure considers the remaining votes. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A18: Pair-Level Effects on Voting: Heterogeneity by Gender

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance (3)	Similarity (4)	Compliance (5)	Similarity (6)
Neighbor × Different Gender	.01	.012	-.0012	-.0021	.0014	.0019
	[.006]***	[<0.001]***	[.86]	[.75]	[.8]	[.71]
	{.017}**	{.005}***	{.82}	{.69}	{.76}	{.71}
Neighbor × Same Gender	-.00011	.00099	.0074	.0064	.0026	.002
	[.98]	[.8]	[.11]	[.21]	[.63]	[.7]
	{.98}	{.77}	{.11}	{.17}	{.58}	{.67}
Same = Different	[.06]*	[.04]**	[.32]	[.31]	[.9]	[.99]
	{.093}*	{.068}*	{.27}	{.28}	{.88}	{.99}
Observations	35259	35259	21589	21589	21638	21638
Same Gender Dummy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.57	2.5	.55	2.5	.57	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.13	.17	.12	.16	.12	.16

Notes: Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Gender is equal to one if both MPs in the pair have the same gender. Different Gender is equal to one minus Same Gender. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A19: How Do Neighbor Effects Depend on Ideological Distance? (Split By Median)

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance (3)	Similarity (4)	Compliance (5)	Similarity (6)
Neighbor × Distant Other-Party	.011	.012	.0012	-.0007	.0018	.0024
	[.0082]***	[.0012]***	[.85]	[.91]	[.69]	[.58]
	{.011}**	{.005}***	{.84}	{.89}	{.73}	{.66}
Neighbor × Close Other-Party	-.0011	.0017	.00061	.0013	-.00016	.000039
	[.8]	[.67]	[.92]	[.83]	[.97]	[.99]
	{.78}	{.71}	{.91}	{.81}	{.98}	{.99}
Close = Distant	[.05]*	[.061]*	[.94]	[.8]	[.78]	[.73]
	{.069}*	{.12}	{.94}	{.82}	{.8}	{.79}
Observations	26599	26599	16252	16252	16185	16185
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.56	2.5	.54	2.5	.55	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.13	.16	.12	.16	.12	.15

Notes: Sample includes only different-party pairs. Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Distant Other-Party is a dummy variable equal to one if the difference between the left-right score (from ParlGov) of the two parties in a pair is above-median. Close Other-Party is a dummy variable equal to one if the difference is below-median. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A20: How Do Neighbor Effects Depend on Ideological Distance? (Split Into Terciles)

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance (3)	Similarity (4)	Compliance (5)	Similarity (6)
Neighbor × Distant Other-Party	.013	.013	.00096	-.002	-.00034	-.00013
	[.016]**	[.0053]***	[.89]	[.77]	[.95]	[.98]
	{.006}***	{.005}***	{.88}	{.73}	{.95}	{.97}
Neighbor × Middle Other-Party	.0019	.0034	.0018	.0031	.0007	.00098
	[.69]	[.44]	[.82]	[.7]	[.91]	[.88]
	{.73}	{.56}	{.79}	{.69}	{.91}	{.9}
Neighbor × Close Other-Party	-.0019	.003	-.00061	-.00082	.0034	.0043
	[.76]	[.6]	[.94]	[.91]	[.53]	[.42]
	{.74}	{.6}	{.94}	{.89}	{.67}	{.56}
Observations	26599	26599	16252	16252	16185	16185
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.56	2.5	.54	2.5	.55	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.13	.16	.12	.16	.12	.15

Notes: Sample includes only different-party pairs. Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Distant Other-Party is a dummy variable equal to one if the difference between the left-right score (from ParlGov) of the two parties in a pair is in the top tercile. Middle Other-Party is a dummy variable for the middle tercile, Close Other-Party is a dummy variable for the bottom tercile. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A21: Pair-Level Effects Before and After the Economic Crisis

	Compliance		Similarity	
	Before 2009/10	2009/10 Onwards	Before 2009/10	2009/10 Onwards
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Neighbor × Different Party	.0075	.00076	.0078	.0056
(proximity effect on bipartisanship)	[.037]**	[.86]	[.021]**	[.19]
	{.029}**	{.86}	{.018}**	{.26}
Neighbor × Same Party	-.00057	.014	.00037	.012
	[.93]	[.19]	[.96]	[.34]
	{.94}	{.27}	{.96}	{.37}
Same = Different	[.24]	[.25]	[.3]	[.63]
	{.35}	{.35}	{.39}	{.66}
Observations	22907	12352	22907	12352
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.57	.58	2.5	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.11	.16	.12	.22

Notes: Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Party is equal to one if both MPs in the pair are in the same party for that session. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A22: Effects of Other-Party Neighbors on Rebellious Voting (Reweighted)

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Leader Non-Compliance (1)	Rebel Rate (2)	Leader Non-Compliance (3)	Rebel Rate (4)	Leader Non-Compliance (5)	Rebel Rate (6)
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor	-.004	-.00051	-.01	.00049	.0073	-.0009
	(.009)	(.00059)	(.011)	(.00057)	(.0089)	(.0006)
	[.66]	[.39]	[.35]	[.39]	[.41]	[.14]
	{.63}	{.41}	{.34}	{.46}	{.5}	{.15}
	<1>	<1>	<1>	<1>		
Observations	1294	1294	826	826	835	835
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.42	.005	.44	.0044	.43	.005
Outcome S.d.	.13	.011	.11	.01	.11	.0073

Notes: Observations are weighted by the block-level inverse probability of treatment assignment, following Gerber and Green (2012). Leader Non-Compliance is the proportion of times the MP votes differently from their party leader in a given session. Rebel Rate is the proportion of times the MP voted yes/abstain (no/abstain) when their party leader voted no (yes) in a given session. Proportion Other-Party Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different party. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Sharpened q-values (Anderson 2008) for non-placebo tests are in <>. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A23: Are Outparty Exposure Effects Larger For the Inexperienced?

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Leader Non-Compliance (1)	Rebel Rate (2)	Leader Non-Compliance (3)	Rebel Rate (4)	Leader Non-Compliance (5)	Rebel Rate (6)
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor	-.012	-.0018*	-.00072	.00045	-.0042	-.000014
	(.012)	(.00099)	(.014)	(.0007)	(.014)	(.00076)
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor × Experience	.0018*	.00014*	.00024	-.000036	.0019*	-.000044
	(.001)	(.000074)	(.0016)	(.000068)	(.0011)	(.00007)
Experience	-.00017	-.00005	.00079	.000076	-.00016	.000067
	(.00085)	(.000055)	(.0016)	(.000057)	(.00087)	(.000049)
Observations	1294	1294	826	826	835	835
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.42	.005	.44	.0044	.43	.005

Notes: Leader Non-Compliance is the proportion of times the MP votes differently from their party leader in a given session. Rebel Rate is the proportion of times the MP voted yes/abstain (no/abstain) when their party leader voted no (yes) in a given session. Proportion Other-Party Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different party. Experience is the number of sessions since first session as Althingi member. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A24: Are Pair-Level Effects Larger When MP Pairs Differ in Experience?

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Compliance (1)	Similarity (2)	Compliance (3)	Similarity (4)	Compliance (5)	Similarity (6)
Neighbor × Different Experience	.0051	.0064	.0061	.0062	.0094	.0091
	[.19]	[.073]*	[.12]	[.12]	[.021]**	[.019]**
	{.19}	{.11}	{.2}	{.2}	{.06}*	{.069}*
Neighbor × Same Experience	.005	.0067	.0013	-.00057	-.004	-.004
	[.14]	[.049]**	[.81]	[.92]	[.37]	[.36]
	{.14}	{.055}*	{.78}	{.9}	{.36}	{.36}
Same = Different	[.98]	[.95]	[.37]	[.25]	[.047]**	[.032]**
	{.99}	{.96}	{.5}	{.35}	{.066}*	{.078}*
Observations	35259	35259	21589	21589	21638	21638
Same Experience Dummy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Session × Party Pair × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.57	2.5	.55	2.5	.57	2.5
Outcome S.d.	.13	.17	.12	.16	.12	.16

Notes: Compliance is the proportion of times the two MPs in a pair vote the same way in a given session. Similarity is the average vote similarity between the two MPs in a pair. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Same Experience is equal to one if the difference in political experience between the two MPs in the pair is five sessions or less. Different Experience is equal to one if the difference in experience is more than five sessions. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE are dummy variables for whether both MPs in a pair were pre-assigned seats, one MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat, or neither MP in a pair was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A25: Effects on Rebellious Voting: Alternative Outcomes

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Party Non-Compliance (1)	Leader Diff. (2)	Party Non-Compliance (3)	Leader Diff. (4)	Party Non-Compliance (5)	Leader Diff. (6)
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor	.0079	.0021	-.0015	.0019	.013	.012
	(.011)	(.008)	(.014)	(.01)	(.014)	(.0098)
	[.47]	[.8]	[.91]	[.85]	[.35]	[.23]
	{.48}	{.79}	{.92}	{.85}	{.33}	{.23}
Observations	1294	1294	826	826	835	835
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.24	.43	.26	.45	.25	.45
Outcome S.d.	.13	.13	.12	.11	.13	.11

Notes: Party Non-Compliance is the proportion of times the MP votes differently from the modal vote in their party in a given session. Leader Diff. is the average vote difference score between the MP and their party leader. Proportion Other-Party Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different party. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A26: Effects on Rebellious Voting on Contested Votes

	Below 50th Votes		Below 25th Votes	
	Leader Non-Compliance (1)	Rebel Rate (2)	Leader Non-Compliance (3)	Rebel Rate (4)
	Panel A: Contemporaneous Effect (t)			
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor	-.001	-.00036	.0028	-.00061
	(.0089)	(.00082)	(.0076)	(.00057)
	[.91]	[.66]	[.71]	[.29]
	{.9}	{.67}	{.71}	{.31}
Observations	1292	1292	1294	1294
	Panel B: One Year Later (t+1)			
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor	-.0017	-.00018	.0014	.00017
	(.012)	(.00092)	(.0098)	(.00051)
	[.89]	[.84]	[.89]	[.73]
	{.88}	{.88}	{.89}	{.77}
Observations	825	825	826	826
	Panel C: Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)			
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor	.014	-.00041	.012	-.00049
	(.011)	(.0011)	(.0097)	(.00054)
	[.19]	[.71]	[.2]	[.37]
	{.19}	{.68}	{.19}	{.37}
Observations	835	835	835	835
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.45	.0078	.42	.005
Outcome S.d.	.13	.013	.13	.011

Notes: Each panel shows the estimates from four linear regressions. Below 50th/25th votes are votes in which the share of MPs voting the modal vote is less than the median/25th percentile among all votes. Leader Non-Compliance is the proportion of times the MP votes differently from their party leader in a given session. Rebel Rate is the proportion of times the MP voted yes/abstain (no/abstain) when their party leader voted no (yes) in a given session. Proportion Other-Party Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different party. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. Outcome Mean and Standard Deviation are for the sample included in the Panel A regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A27: Effects of Other-Coalition Exposure on Rebellious Voting

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Leader Non-Compliance (1)	Rebel Rate (2)	Leader Non-Compliance (3)	Rebel Rate (4)	Leader Non-Compliance (5)	Rebel Rate (6)
Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor	-.002	.00039	-.0025	.00087	.0095	-.000067
	(.0068)	(.00046)	(.0077)	(.00065)	(.0078)	(.00045)
	[.77]	[.4]	[.74]	[.18]	[.23]	[.88]
	{.76}	{.51}	{.78}	{.27}	{.28}	{.89}
	<1>	<1>	<1>	<1>		
Observations	1294	1294	826	826	835	835
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.42	.005	.44	.0044	.43	.005
Outcome S.d.	.13	.011	.11	.01	.11	.0073

Notes: Leader Non-Compliance is the proportion of times the MP votes differently from their party leader in a given session. Rebel Rate is the proportion of times the MP voted yes/abstain (no/abstain) when their party leader voted no (yes) in a given session. Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different coalition. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Sharpened q-values (Anderson 2008) for non-placebo tests are in <>. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A28: Effects on Rebellious Voting by Intensity of Contact

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Leader Non-Compliance (1)	Rebel Rate (2)	Leader Non-Compliance (3)	Rebel Rate (4)	Leader Non-Compliance (5)	Rebel Rate (6)
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor = 1/2	.0078	.00069	-.014	.00015	.0041	.00031
	[.4]	[.36]	[.28]	[.7]	[.66]	[.54]
	{.42}	{.25}	{.2}	{.81}	{.69}	{.62}
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor = 1	.0057	-.00016	-.0047	.0002	.012	-.00024
	[.49]	[.74]	[.67]	[.66]	[.2]	[.62]
	{.49}	{.78}	{.65}	{.74}	{.24}	{.69}
Observations	1294	1294	826	826	835	835
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.42	.005	.44	.0044	.43	.005
Outcome S.d.	.13	.011	.11	.01	.11	.0073

Notes: Leader Non-Compliance is the proportion of times the MP votes differently from their party leader in a given session. Rebel Rate is the proportion of times the MP voted yes/abstain (no/abstain) when their party leader voted no (yes) in a given session. Proportion Other-Party Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different party. MP-clustered p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A29: Effects of Other-Coalition Exposure by Intensity of Contact

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Leader Non-Compliance (1)	Rebel Rate (2)	Leader Non-Compliance (3)	Rebel Rate (4)	Leader Non-Compliance (5)	Rebel Rate (6)
Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor = 1/2	.00046	.00091	-.0052	.001	-.0066	-.00064
	[.95]	[.07]*	[.53]	[.22]	[.4]	[.17]
	{.94}	{.089}*	{.51}	{.15}	{.39}	{.17}
Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor = 1	-.002	.00038	-.0023	.00084	.0099	-.000046
	[.77]	[.42]	[.77]	[.18]	[.21]	[.92]
	{.76}	{.51}	{.79}	{.29}	{.26}	{.93}
Observations	1294	1294	826	826	835	835
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.42	.005	.44	.0044	.43	.005
Outcome S.d.	.13	.011	.11	.01	.11	.0073

Notes: Leader Non-Compliance is the proportion of times the MP votes differently from their party leader in a given session. Rebel Rate is the proportion of times the MP voted yes/abstain (no/abstain) when their party leader voted no (yes) in a given session. Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different coalition. MP-clustered p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A30: Effects on Absence and Abstention

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Absent (1)	Abstain (2)	Absent (3)	Abstain (4)	Absent (5)	Abstain (6)
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor	.012	-.0019	-.000016	-.0045	.0043	.00066
	(.014)	(.0014)	(.018)	(.0019)	(.018)	(.0013)
	[.41]	[.18]	[1]	[.018]**	[.81]	[.61]
	{.36}	{.13}	{1}	{.004}***	{.79}	{.6}
Observations	1294	1294	826	826	835	835
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.27	.032	.29	.032	.27	.031
Outcome S.d.	.16	.046	.15	.048	.15	.04

Notes: Absent is the proportion of times the MP was absent for a vote in a given session. Abstain is the proportion of times the MP abstained from voting in a given session. Proportion Other-Party Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different party. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A31: Pair-Level Effects on Co-Sponsorship Links with Undivided Attention

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Number (1)	IHS (2)	Number (3)	IHS (4)	Number (5)	IHS (6)
Neighbor × Corner	-.07	.0015	.29	.089	-.14	.038
	[.61]	[.98]	[.075]*	[.12]	[.48]	[.6]
	{.67}	{.98}	{.15}	{.17}	{.45}	{.56}
	<1>	<1>	<.92>	<.92>		
Neighbor × Middle	-.0085	-.0071	.043	.011	-.0051	.0055
	[.92]	[.8]	[.71]	[.78]	[.95]	[.89]
	{.9}	{.76}	{.69}	{.76}	{.95}	{.88}
	<1>	<1>	<1>	<1>		
Corner = Middle	[.62]	[.87]	[.071]*	[.16]	[.55]	[.7]
	{.7}	{.87}	{.3}	{.3}	{.51}	{.67}
Observations	22687	22687	15172	15172	15130	15130
Session × Corner FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Session × Party Pair FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	1.9	.98	1.9	.97	1.8	.93
Outcome S.d.	2.7	.94	3	.97	2.6	.92

Notes: Regressions include different-party dyads only, with neither MP pre-assigned seats. Number is the total number of co-sponsorship links between the two MPs in a pair in a given session. IHS is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of Number. Neighbor is a dummy variable equal to one if the MPs in the pair are randomly assigned to sit next to each other during that session. Corner is equal to one if at least one MP in pair has only one seating neighbor. Middle is equal to one minus Corner. Dyadic-robust p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Sharpened q-values (Anderson 2008) for non-placebo tests are in <>. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A32: Effects on Bipartisan Co-Sponsorship Links (Reweighted)

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Number (1)	IHS (2)	Number (3)	IHS (4)	Number (5)	IHS (6)
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor	-.77	.02	10	.096	5.4	.039
	(3.4)	(.079)	(4.7)	(.11)	(3.7)	(.11)
	[.82]	[.8]	[.03]**	[.38]	[.14]	[.72]
	{.86}	{.83}	{.052}*	{.45}	{.29}	{.74}
	<1>	<1>	<.14>	<1>		
Observations	1420	1420	941	941	946	946
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	82	4.7	83	4.5	76	4.5
Outcome S.d.	76	1.1	82	1.3	73	1.2

Notes: Observations are weighted by the block-level inverse probability of treatment assignment, following Gerber and Green (2012). Number is the total number of co-sponsorship links between the MP and any other-party MP in a given session. IHS is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of Number. Proportion Other-Party Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different party. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A33: Effects on Bipartisan Co-Sponsorship Links by Intensity of Contact

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Number	IHS	Number	IHS	Number	IHS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor = 1/2	5.3	.12	7.5	.041	4.9	-.037
	[.16]	[.16]	[.083]*	[.75]	[.21]	[.66]
	{.19}	{.13}	{.14}	{.76}	{.33}	{.74}
Proportion Other-Party Neighbor = 1	3.5	.095	11	.17	5.7	.068
	[.36]	[.22]	[.013]**	[.19]	[.12]	[.41]
	{.39}	{.26}	{.029}**	{.17}	{.24}	{.59}
Observations	1420	1420	941	941	946	946
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	82	4.7	83	4.5	76	4.5
Outcome S.d.	76	1.1	82	1.3	73	1.2

Notes: Number is the total number of co-sponsorship links between the MP and any other-party MP in a given session. IHS is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of Number. Proportion Other-Party Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different party. MP-clustered p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A34: Effects of Other-Coalition Exposure on Bipartisan Co-Sponsorship Links

	Contemporaneous Effect (t)		One Year Later (t+1)		Previous Year (Placebo) (t-1)	
	Number	IHS	Number	IHS	Number	IHS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor	3.2	.028	9	.15	6.1	.044
	(3.3)	(.056)	(4.5)	(.089)	(4.5)	(.082)
	[.33]	[.62]	[.047]**	[.1]	[.18]	[.59]
	{.29}	{.65}	{.046}**	{.14}	{.13}	{.61}
	<.29>	<.45>	<.23>	<.23>		
Observations	1420	1420	941	941	946	946
Session × Party × Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	82	4.7	83	4.5	76	4.5
Outcome S.d.	76	1.1	82	1.3	73	1.2

Notes: Number is the total number of co-sponsorship links between the MP and any other-party MP in a given session. IHS is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of Number. Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different coalition. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. Randomization inference p-values (1000 draws) are in curly brackets. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. For lead and lag specifications, sessions are also dropped where lead/lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A35: Do Effects of Other-Coalition Exposure Compound?

	Voting		Co-Sponsorship	
	Leader Non-Compliance (1)	Rebel Rate (2)	Number (3)	IHS (4)
Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor	-.00075	-.00037	-6	-.095
	(.015)	(.00068)	(6.4)	(.11)
Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor (t-1)	.000063	-.00067	.94	.0058
	(.012)	(.00055)	(6)	(.095)
Prop. Oth.-Coalition Neigh. $\times$ Prop. Oth.-Coalition Neigh. (t-1)	-.0053	.0019*	18*	.26
	(.022)	(.0011)	(9.4)	(.17)
Observations	840	840	924	924
Session $\times$ Party $\times$ Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome Mean	.44	.0044	85	4.7

Notes: Leader Non-Compliance is the proportion of times the MP votes differently from their party leader in a given session. Rebel Rate is the proportion of times the MP voted yes/abstain (no/abstain) when their party leader voted no (yes) in a given session. Number is the total number of co-sponsorship links between the MP and any other-party MP in a given session. IHS is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of Number. Proportion Other-Coalition Neighbor is the proportion of left-right seating neighbors from a different coalition. MP-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Special sessions and a short session (2017) are excluded. Sessions are also dropped where lag would be a special/short session or a session in a different parliamentary term. Strata FE is a dummy variable for whether MP was pre-assigned a seat. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

B Expert Survey

B.1 Script

We received ethics approval from UBC (#H23-00154) to contact Icelandic MPs with a short survey. We successfully emailed 64 sitting main and deputy MPs using the email addresses listed on the *Althingi* website here. We also successfully contacted 36 ex-MPs elected since 2013, by email, LinkedIn, and social media. 19% (12) of sitting MPs and 6% (2) of ex-MPs gave answers. Our email included three questions to provide short qualitative answers to three questions. The full script is as follows:

Dear [MP name],

I am an [Position and school redacted], and I have written a paper on the effects of the random seating arrangement in the Alþingi. This paper has been invited for resubmission at a leading political science journal (the Journal of Politics).

To check that I am not misrepresenting how the Alþingi functions, I wondered whether you would have a few minutes to share your expert thoughts on the three questions below? Since your time is valuable, as a small thank you, I will give 3,000 ISK to a charity of your choice for your thoughts.

1. How much do MPs assigned to sit next to each other interact, and what types of interactions do they have? For example: is it common for seating neighbours to share conversations on voting days or otherwise, do seating neighbours ever become close friends and interact outside of the chamber, etc.

2. If you had to guess, how do you think an MP might influence the voting (if only a little bit) of another MP that sits next to them?

3. In American politics, co-sponsorship networks are often used to proxy for social networks. Is that a reasonable assumption in the Icelandic context? For example, do co-sponsors of legislation in the Alþingi tend to spend time working together, or might they not even interact at all?

Note: while your answers may be quoted in the paper, your identity would be kept anonymous, with the quote attributed to "an ex-MP."

Thank you for helping with my research!

Best,

[Name redacted]

[Website redacted]

Study Title: Legislature Integration and Bipartisanship: Expert Survey

If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the [University name redacted] Office of Research Ethics at 604-822-8598 or if long distance e-mail [University email redacted] or call toll free [University phone number redacted].

B.2 Anonymized Responses

We report the responses to each of the three questions in full below, with a randomly assigned ID uniquely identifying a given MP's answers across questions. Asterisks indicate responses from ex-MPs, while all other responses are from sitting MPs.

1. **How much do MPs assigned to sit next to each other interact, and what types of interactions do they have? For example: is it common for seating neighbours to share conversations on voting days or otherwise, do seating neighbours ever become close friends and interact outside of the chamber, etc.**

(1) The amount of and nature of interactions depends on the people in question. People with a similar outlook, irrespective of party, tend talk [sic] and "joke around" more than those with conflicting views. This is by no means a rule though, a bigger factor is the personality of the MP's sitting together. Obviously talkative or outgoing people will converse more than others.

MP's often have a personal affinity with people they disagree with politicly [sic] (even more than with their own party members (competitors)). The seating arrangement is how ever [sic] not a big factor in this regard. Such friendships are more often the result of communications outside

the chamber, in committees, on travels, over coffee etc. Hence MP's that already like each other will make use of their proximity rather than the seating arrangement being a deciding factor.

(2) The interaction depends on people and personality, but overall there is an amicable interaction between parliamentarians sitting next to each other across party lines. Some voting days may be a bit fraught but MPs take care not to make it personal while sitting in their assigned seats. Sometimes you get to know someone well sitting next to you who you would otherwise not be in contact with, as you might not be sitting on the some [sic] committees or be from different parties.

(3) It is only my 2nd year in Alþingi so I only have my experience to share and those I can watch from my seat. I would say it varies. You can end up sitting with someone from your party and that colours the interactions. I would say that we talk during voting days for sure, when we don't have to be quiet not to miss out on anything. Some of the MPs have had more collision with other MP sand [sic] interactions with Ministers (who are this term all MPs) are usually more formal. It is quite common for MPs to form friendships throughout party lines. May [sic] there is some division between those in government and those in opposition each term. We are a nation of only 370 thousand so some of us have even had close ties before being elected.

(4) Friendly conversation mostly smal [sic] talk

(5) To sum up, I would say the atmosphere in the parliament is professional and friendly, in general at least.

(6) We "chat" (whisper) things to each other while other MPs are at the podium speaking, or challenging what they are saying. We will also often give each other positive feedback after a neighbor has given a speech or asked a minister a good challenging question. In my case both my neighbors, like me are from opposition parties, so I guess the interaction is different when you have someone from the coalition party sitting next to you. Last year, I did have one coalition member sitting next to me and since we also shared a committee we got to know each other much better - and that then also led to us working closer on finding common grounds on some bills being discussed in the committee. On voting days, the interaction is not much different, we usually vote more as a party group rather than being influenced by someone sitting next to you.

The seating is changed every year (draw of a ball from a box), so you get to know new neighbors each year. I am sure some people become good friends, but I think it is more common that people at least become a bit closer - which then enables them to do better discussions with each other outside of the chamber.

(7) Not much. MPs generally don't sit much in the chamber during discussions and since it's a small chamber whispering interrupts the proceedings. I would say seating arrangement has little to no impact outside of the chamber.

(8) Alþingi is small, only 63 MPs and it is inevitable that we get to know people and become friendly. It is also inevitable that we like some people more than others. I have never felt that who I'm sat next to during voting has any effect as the time spent voting in assembly is limited. If I like the person sitting next to me I'll chat with them, otherwise not. Much more of our time is spent in committee meetings. The MPs we get to know the best are the ones we work with them ost [sic] in committees or other groups.

(9) Lot of chat, sometimes about the issue sometimes just friendly chat. We interact a lot outside of the chamber and important to have broader support with Your [sic] ideas than the majority. It is different between politicians though but parliamentarians have greater connection between themselves than ministers can. They aren't as much in the parliaments even though they are parliamentarians. As a parliamentarian before I was appointed minister I had good friendship with MPs from the minority.

(10) My party forms part of the minority/opposition in parliament. I have members of other parties in the opposition on both sides now, but before I had members of the majority on both sides (we draw again at the beginning of every session, for approximately one year). The members of the majority rarely attend parliament sessions, mainly for voting, but when they are there we may exchange jokes and friendly comments, but not too much so as not to interrupt the ongoing discussion (the room is too small and echo-ing for much conversation outside the podium). I feel little difference whether my neighbors are from "friendly" parties or not.

(11) It really depends on the relationship between the members how much they interact. I have been very interactive with some who sit next to me, others I barely speak to. The parliament

room is very small, so often you are rather speaking with the person sitting in front of you or behind you if you have a friendlier relationship with them. Personally, I can not attribute sitting next to someone as the basis for our friendship. Often there is chitchat between people sitting next to each other.

(12) From my experience, seating neighbours mainly chit chat and joke about what is going on in the hall. When the conversation turns towards the voting itself, it is not about the politics but practical questions ('ah we're voting about this particular section now' and so on). The peer pressure and the endeavour to influence the vote of other MPs would be within each parliamentary party via internet chats (but most of it has hapoened [sic] before the vote itself of course). One thing: the Parliament room is incredibly small, almost like a class room. You are close to the obe [sic] sitting next to you, but probably an MP from your party sits right behind you or in front of you, so the political discussion would rather be amongst you and them.

(13*) Depends on the person you're sitting next to. If you personally like the person you're sitting next to you'll interact quite a lot. Mostly on non-political stuff. Everyday kind of things like you would a co-worker. Jokes are quite common.

(14*) Usually, the MPs do not spend that much time in the main chamber. During longer plenary discussion mostly just the couple of MPs actively taking part in the discussion are present. Others are in their offices og [sic] in party meeting rooms. So you do not necessarily spend that much time with your assigned neighbour. This is different during voting sessions when most MPs are actually in the room. But then the communication is mostly limited to one-line sentences ranging from "what item is this again?" to political trash-talk. I usually did not find these randomly assigned neighbours becoming close friends or interacting outside the chamber, unless they are good buddies to begin with.

2. **If you had to guess, how do you think an MP might influence the voting (if only a little bit) of another MP that sits next to them?**

(1) Seating arrangements have virtually no influence on how MP's vote. Usually, they are following the party line and once in a while strong convictions that go against the party. The exception is when MP's point out that the person sitting next to them has forgotten to vote or voted the

"wrong" way, i.e., made an obvious mistake by pressing the wrong button. A joke might be made about whether someone is really going to vote a certain way, but no one tries to use the proximity to influence the vote.

(2) There is very little "cross-contamination" when it comes to voting. The parliamentary groups have in almost all cases taken a joint decision on how they are going to vote beforehand.

(3) I would think that is minimum and to my knowledge MPs usually don't discuss how they are voting. You can see it on a table on the wall and it is quite common for MPs to go up and explain how they are voting. MPs also usually vote according to party lines so. . . .

(4) Never any influence on voting.

(5) To this date I have not cast a vote on a legislation as my participation has only been about the parliament schedule – i.e. if the president of the parliament suggests for a lengthened working day or if an MP suggests for a legislation to be sent back to a committee. These votes can become political. Our party chairman gives out a suggestion of a stance (yes, no, no vote) via Signal, and we usually follow suit. I share very limited interaction with my seating neighbors, although it is an amiable environment. It is hard to imagine an influence in that matter, though not impossible, but my experience is lacking in this matter.

(6) I think it is very unlikely it influences the voting – the party whips are more in control of what you are told to vote each time. Very few parties are like we in the Pirate Party where we don't have to follow the party line if our conscious tells us otherwise.

(7) Not at all.

(8) I dont believe seeting [sic] in any way influences the votes. Votes are always decided before hand during party meetings.

(9) Not a lot, but ofcourse [sic] close talk will always help and could get majority extra support.

(10) Not at all. Voting is mainly determined by each party beforehand and not much decided in the room itself. My party may be a bit different in this respect (we are the weird quirky ones) but my vote could be influenced by something said by another MP giving a formal comment from

the podium during the voting, or by a comment made from anywhere in the room, but no [sic] rather from a person sitting next to me than others.

(11) I think the biggest influence is helping in keeping track of where we are in the voting process, it can get confusing and people loose [sic] track. The person next to you will tell you what exactly we are voting on, which helps you vote, normally within your party's predecided vote. Party affiliation is by far the strongest influencer of voting behavior. That said, in opposition it is relatively common for people/whole parties within the opposition changing their vote after a good explanation of a fellow opposition member (from a different party) in the pulpit.

(12) It would be by pointing out that the neighbour is misunderstanding what article or section the particular vote is about, pointing to a mistake ('hmm you sure?')

(13*) For most parties the votes are decided beforehand. The whole party votes in an certain way. I don't think that an MP sitting next to you could influence the voting in any way.

(14*) I would not think that it does really. The parliamentary clubs hold meetings on mondays and wednesdays and coordinate their voting beforehand. During the votes each MP follows a script and they are unsure, they look at the light on the voting panel and check on how the club chair is voting and copy them. For that purpose the club chairs are seated next to the walkway, so that their votes could be tracked easily by others. Of course, there are sometimes big high profile issues where parties split but then I don't think that seating has much impact on how people vote. The club chairs today sit in these spots so other MPs could track their votes easily.

3. **In American politics, co-sponsorship networks are often used to proxy for social networks. Is that a reasonable assumption in the Icelandic context? For example, do co-sponsors of legislation in the Alþingi tend to spend time working together, or might they not even interact at all?**

(1) Co-sponsorship primarily depends on the matter in question. MP's will try to get those that they believe might agree with (or have difficulty opposing) the proposal to sign. Quite often MP's will ask others from their constituency to co-sponsor a bill that has significance for the

constituency (fix a certain bridge etc). Co-sponsors might work together on a bill, particularly if they are in the same party but more often one MP will get staff to help him or her in writing a bill and then ask likely takers if they want to take part or simply send a message to all parliamentary groups asking who would like to join.

(2) Co-sponsoring bills and proposal is common and happens across party lines, but not as often across the lines that divide parties that support the government and those who are in opposition. In a small 63 member parliament there is often close cooperation across party lines in the parliamentary committees even if people disagree on the matter at hand.

(3) I don't think that is very common. Also, in Iceland a very high percentage of new legislation comes from the Ministers. Almost no laws pass that origin from MPs...

(4) No working gether [sic]

(5) As regarding the last question, I'm sorry to say that I have no valuable insight on the subject.

(6) It is not as formal in Iceland as it is for example in the UK, where they have All Party Parliamentary Groups on certain subjects. Since co-sponsorship is often done via email (requests go out to all MPs) - that doesn't have any social implications. There are however exceptions to this, where we go out to likeminded MPs in other parties with bills related to topics we are passionate about. For example when it comes to Gender Based Violence, there is a good-sized group of us, from all parties that works together and co-sponsors bills related to this. That then in turn leads to us working more closely together on other related subjects and also enables us to talk more openly and freely in confidence with each other. Since bills proposed by MPs have a very very small chance of passing, having a broad co-sponsorship increases the likelihood of it being the 1-2 MP bills per party that get approved each year.

(7) Co-sponsorship is most common within parties and within coalition parties (government / opposition). In some cases there are issues that span an ideology and as such rally people to co-sponsorship across the isle. The issues might also be related to a geographical area and thus MPs from that area co-sponsor the issue. Other social connections than that are incredibly rare.

(8) Co-sponsors do not work together at all. If someone asks met o [sic] co-sponsor, I will read the legislation and perhaps offer up advice or ask for slight changes, but that's the extent of it.

(9) I dont know it.

(10) I'm not sure if I understand the concept of co-sponsorship very well in this context, but sometimes we put our name on bills from MP's from other parties, and we may request such support from others as well. When this happens we may chat in the halls, but there's no cooperation and usually we don't interact at all except by confirming our support by email or orally during breaks. Let me know if I have misunderstood the question.

(11) They don't usually spend time together in that context.

(12) I've not noticed this in the Icelandic context no.

(13*) They will spend some time working together within their committees when co-sponsoring legislation from within their committee. If the legislation doesn't origin [sic] from within a committee then people who are co-sponsoring it might not even interact at all. If you have something that you're putting forward as an MP you might send an email out to all the MPs asking simply "Hey, I'm putting this forward soon. Anyone want to co-sponsor?" and that will usually get you a few other MPs. Yes, this has led to some unfortunate "Reply All" incidents.

(14*) Very interesting subject. As you probably know most of the legislation that actually passes in Iceland comes from the government. However bills sponsored by MPs are common, they often start a discussion. They get debated, consulted and a handful of them pass each session (usually if they are relatively uncontroversial).

They come in different forms. It is common for a party (i.e. all its club members) to present a bill as a political statement. Sometimes members from a single district present a bill together if it represents their area interests. This might be something like a proposal to build a road etc.

Then there are other bills which are presented by people from different parties which I guess tell you the most about cross-party alliances. In 99% of those cases however the first MP mentioned is the real author of the bill. He or she then sends out a call to other MPs, asking for co-sponsors. So the MPs usually do not work on those bills together. Exceptions are very few

bills which are likely to be highly debated (e.g. abolition of alcohol monopoly, referendum on eu accession talks) where sometimes some negotiations take place beforehand to get as many people on board as possible. Having said that I would definitely say tha [sic] co-sponsorships do provide some indications on who is friends with whom in the Parliament, because, although some parties do have policies where sponsorships of single party members must be discussed in the club, there is generally less discipline in co-sponsorships then there is when it comes to voting.

C Data Appendix

In this section, we give further detail about our data sources and construction. Links are to the *Althingi* website unless stated otherwise.

- The link between session numbers and years can be found here.
- MP biographies are scraped from the *Althingi* website's pages, with one example here for Andrés Ingi Jónsson. The data includes each MP's party, constituency, gender, whether and when the MP was the chair of a parliamentary group, ministerial and committee history, and the MP's ID. We use this biographical data to link with the co-sponsorship and speech data. Where party affiliation is unclear, we supplement this data with bill co-sponsorship data, which can be used to identify an MP's party at a particular point in time. We obtain this data from here.
- We use data from ParlGov (from here) to measure the left-right ideological position of each political party – their measure is a time-invariant unweighted mean value of information from party expert surveys on a 0 to 10 scale. We use this measure to estimate proximity effects separately for different-party neighbors that belong to ideologically-similar vs. ideologically-distant parties.
- For additional balance checks, we collected data on wages and expense claims since 2007 from here.
- Initial seating assignment data for sessions from 1995-96 to 2017-18 is scraped from pages like this. This page shows the assignments for session 2015-2016. For sessions 1991-92 to 1994-95, we collected data from scanned copies of the congressional records, available here. The data contain seat number and MP name. We establish the mapping from seat number to seat location by comparing this data with the images of the end of session seating assignments. We link this seating data with biographical data by matching on MP name.
- Seating at the end of each session can be found here. The images contain each seat's physical location and the name of the MP in each seat. We do not use this for analysis

except for comparison to the initial seating assignments.

- Roll-call voting data can be found here. For each vote we have: MP name, MP vote (yes, no, absent, abstention), vote date, and associated bill ID. We drop the (less frequent) votes taken by deputy MPs. These deputies are called upon when MPs are absent due to (i) government duties lasting more than 5 days, (ii) duties abroad, and (iii) health reasons. We web-scraped the topic of each bill from the *Althingi* website here (only available since the 2001-02 session).

- The identities and terms of party leaders were kindly provided by Axel Viðar Egilsson, Project Manager at the Research Service of the *Althingi*. We linked this data with voting data to construct our MP-level outcome variables *Leader Non-Compliance* and *Rebel Rate*.

- Co-sponsorship data can be found here. For each bill we have: bill name, sponsor ID, name, and party, and co-sponsor IDs, names, and parties.

D Discussion of Saia (2018)

Saia (2018) and this project were conducted independently, but both papers use the same natural experiment, which warrants some discussion. The objective of this Appendix section is twofold. First, although the two papers' aims are different, there is one result that is inconsistent between the two. We provide evidence that the inconsistency is due in part to a misspecification in Saia (2018). Note that this is not to reject all findings in Saia (2018)—the paper has other interesting findings including some data-driven discussions about the US Congress. Second, we demonstrate that randomization inference is a useful tool to verify complex regression specifications. This adds credibility to the regression results discussed in the main sections of this paper.

Saia (2018) finds that when an MP's other-party neighbor votes differently from the MP's party leader's vote, this MP is 30 to 50 percentage points more likely to also vote differently from the party leader's vote. This can be interpreted as evidence of the bipartisan proximity effect on MP-level bipartisan voting. We provide evidence that the main table for this claim in Saia (2018) (Table 4) is misspecified, and the result he finds is driven by a mechanical correlation.

Saia (2018) begins with the following MP-vote-level specification:

$$Non\text{-}compliance_{iv} = \alpha + \beta_1 Divergent\,Peers_{iv} + \varepsilon_{iv}$$

where $Non\text{-}compliance_{iv}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value one when the vote of the focal legislator i in voting procedure v is different from her own party line. Votes and party lines can be: Yes (67% of party lines), Absence (17% of party lines), Abstained (11% of party lines), or No (5% of party lines). $Divergent\,Peers_{iv}$ is the fraction of legislators seated nearby with voting decisions different from the party line of legislator i observed in procedure v. Standard errors are clustered at the MP-session-level. Saia (2018) then instruments for the behavior of peers by using the party lines of peers: i.e., $Divergent\,Peers_{iv}$ is instrumented for using $Divergent\ peers'\ party\,lines_{iv}$—the fraction of peers whose party lines observed in voting procedure v are different from the party line of legislator i. In addition, Saia (2018) shows the key 2SLS coefficient (on $Divergent\,Peers_{iv}$) to be robust to including various sets of fixed effects: MP, Seat, Voting Procedure, Party-by-Session, Peers' Parties $\neq$MP i's party, and MP-by-Topic

(see his Table 4).

Our claim is that *Divergent Peers*$_{iv}$ (and indeed the IV *Divergent peers' party lines*$_{iv}$) is mechanically positively correlated with the dependent variable, *Non-compliance*$_{iv}$, and that this will be the case even in the absence of any causal peer effect, and even conditional on the fixed effects and other controls that Saia (2018) includes. To see this, consider a simplified setting. Suppose there are only two possible votes: yes and no, and that no votes are much rarer—10% of votes are nos and 90% of votes are yeses. Suppose that everyone votes randomly (implying that there are no peer effects). In this setting, when i's party leader votes no, 90% of MPs are "divergent," and 90% of each MP's peers (on average), whether seated next to that MP or not, are "divergent." When the party leader instead votes yes, 10% of MPs are "divergent," and 10% of each MP's peers are "divergent." In this simplified setting, the more divergent i's neighbors are, the more likely it is that i's party leader voted no. The more likely it is that i's party leader voted no, the more likely it is that i herself is divergent. It follows that the more divergent i's neighbors are, the more likely it is that i herself is divergent. This correlation is mechanical—working through the effect of having divergent peers on the type of vote of i's party leader.

We demonstrate that this claim is true by showing results from a series of regressions. In Column 1 of Table C1, we first replicate Column 3 of Table 4 in Saia (2018) with the party line data kindly provided by Saia.[1] We get a near-identical result, where the slight difference is likely due to differences in data collection methods and data cleaning procedures.

As evidence of a mechanical correlation, we show in Columns 2-5 of Table C1 that *Divergent peers*$_{iv}$ is predictive of the type of vote of MP i's party leader even conditional on the fixed effects and with the instrument. Furthermore, as shown in Column 6, the estimated 2SLS coefficient on *Divergent Peers*$_{iv}$ becomes less positive after controlling for party leader vote fixed effects (i.e., four dummy variables for whether the party leader votes Yes, No, Absence, Abstain). Finally, the estimated 2SLS coefficient on *Divergent Peers*$_{iv}$ becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero after controlling appropriately for Voting Procedure-by-Party fixed effects (as opposed to just Voting Procedure fixed effects)—since within each Voting Procedure-by-Party cell, there

[1] We choose this column here because it has the highest number of observations and the largest set of fixed effects that we could include. All other columns suffer from the same source of mechanical correlation—Figure C1 gives results of randomization inference for Columns 3 and 6. Note that we do not have the topics of voting procedures in our data, which makes us unable to replicate his Column 4 and 7. This does not affect identification. We follow the same sample selection procedure as in Saia (2018).

is no longer any variation in the type of vote by the party leader, eliminating the mechanical correlation (though there remains variation in *Divergent peers' party lines*$_{iv}$).

Table C1: Replication of Table 4 in Saia (2018) and raising concerns

	Col.3 replication	Party leader vote				Col.3 with appropriate FEs	
	Non-compl-iance (1)	No (2)	Yes (3)	Abstain (4)	Absent (5)	Non-compl-iance (6)	Non-compl-iance (7)
Divergent Peers	0.30***	-0.02**	-0.88***	0.30***	0.60***	0.07**	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
MP FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Seat FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Peers' Parties $\neq$ MP i's party	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Voting Procedure FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	(implicit)
Party $\times$ Session FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	(implicit)
Party Leader Vote FEs	N	N	N	N	N	YES	(implicit)
Party $\times$ Voting Procedure FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	YES
MP $\times$ Topic FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Observations	1064563	1064563	1064563	1064563	1064563	1064563	1053203

Notes: Each column in this table originates from a separate 2SLS regression. Non-compliance is a dummy variable indicating that the MP voted differently from their party leader for the particular voting procedure. In Columns 2-5, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating the vote of the MP's party leader. Standard errors are clustered at MP-session-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.

In Figure C1, we show that the estimated 2SLS coefficients on *Divergent Peers*$_{iv}$ remain positive in a placebo specification in which we calculate the right-hand-side variables using a counterfactual random draw (100 times) of the seating arrangement. We run specifications equivalent to Columns 3 and 6 of Table 4 in Saia (2018) for each random draw. The histogram of the coefficients on *Divergent Peers*$_{iv}$ from 100 placebo 2SLS regressions are shown in the Figure. Despite the fact that the seating arrangement is artificial and thus we should not get positive results, we get a positive and statistically significant coefficient on *Divergent Peers*$_{iv}$ for both specifications in all 100 draws, confirming the intuition on mechanical correlation. From the randomization inference point of view, the results in Table 4 of Saia (2018) are no longer statistically significant—the p-values from the randomization inference are 0.44 and 0.21.

Figure C1: Randomization inference of Table 4 in Saia (2018) using counterfactual seating



Notes: Histograms report coefficients on *Divergent Peers*$_{iv}$ of 2SLS specifications from Columns 3 and 6 of Table 4 in Saia (2018) with counterfactual seating arrangements (100 re-randomizations). Red lines indicate corresponding coefficients on Divergent Peers from the specification using the actual seating arrangement.

This result demonstrates the usefulness of randomization inference as a misspecification check. Throughout the main sections of this paper, we provide p-values from both large-sample inference and randomization inference.

E Reconciling Pair-Level With Individual-Level Effects

E.1 Theory

We outline a simple model to show that cue-taking from different-party neighbors need not imply a fall in party discipline. We make the following assumptions. There exist N MPs (where N is a multiple of eight), out of which half belong to party A and half belong to party B. N is large, allowing us to simplify expressions below by taking N to infinity. Simpler than the Icelandic setting, assume that each MP has only one seating neighbor, with seating randomly assigned such that $\frac{N}{2}$ MPs sit next to a same-party MP and $\frac{N}{2}$ MPs sit next to a different-party MP.

MPs vote once, without loss of generality. The party line for party A is "yes" and the party line for party B is "no." Each MP has a "natural vote" – the vote choice they would make in the absence of any neighbor influence. Fraction r of each party are rebels: they have a natural vote which is against the party line.

For simplicity, we assume no influence between same-party neighbors, but influence between different-party neighbors is possible. In particular, an MP can influence their different-party neighbor's vote with probability p_l when the two neighbors would otherwise vote the party line. Otherwise, when the two neighbors would both rebel without influence, we say that the probability of influence is p_r. Influence is symmetric: p_l and p_r do not vary by party. Finally, when both MPs have the same natural vote, no influence occurs. In more detail, the three possible cases for different-party MP pairs are:

1. With probability $(1-r)^2$, the natural votes are party line voting (Party A MP votes "yes," Party B MP votes "no"). We call the Party A MP a and the Party B MP b. With probability p_l b influences a, such that both vote no; with probability p_l a influences b, such that both vote yes; with probability $1-2p_l$, neither influence the other, such that both vote their natural vote.

2. With probability r^2, the natural votes are rebellious voting (Party A MP votes "no," Party B MP votes "yes"). With probability p_r b influences a, such that both vote yes; with probability p_r a influences b, such that both vote no; with probability $1-2p_r$, neither influence the other, such that both vote their natural vote.

3. With probability $2r(1-r)$, the natural votes are aligned – both MPs in the pair vote the same way. Here there is no scope for influence (ruling out the possibility of negative cue-taking).

With these assumptions, we can now solve for the individual-level and pair-level effects of outparty exposure as a function of the underlying persuasion parameters (p_l and p_r) and the rebellion rate (r).

First, we define P_{ls} as the probability that an MP with a same-party neighbor votes the party line, and P_{ld} as the probability that an MP with a different-party neighbor votes the party line. The former is simply the probability that the MP does not rebel, since same-party neighbors are assumed to exert no influence. The latter is the sum of three probabilities: (i) the probability of both MPs having a party-line natural vote and the focal MP not being persuaded, $(1-r)^2(1-p_l)$; (ii) the probability of both MPs having a rebelling natural vote and the focal MP being persuaded, $r^2 p_r$; and (iii) the probability of both MPs having an aligned natural vote equal to the focal MP's party line, $r(1-r)$. This gives us the following two lemmas, which we then use to state the individual-level effect of outparty exposure.

Lemma 1.

$$\begin{aligned} P_{ls} &= P[\textit{vote party line if have same-party neighbor}] \\ &= 1-r \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 2.

$$\begin{aligned} P_{ld} &= P[\textit{vote party line if have different-party neighbor}] \\ &= (1-r)(r+(1-p_l)(1-r)) + p_r r^2 \end{aligned}$$

Proposition 1. *Δ_i is the individual-level effect of outparty exposure on party-line voting, defined as the difference in party-line voting between MPs with a different-party neighbor and those with a same-party neighbor (as in our MP-level regression specification):*

$$\Delta_i = P_{ld} - P_{ls} = p_r r^2 - p_l(1-r)^2$$

All proofs are below. The first proposition establishes that cross-party peer influence need not reduce party-line voting – Δ_i can be positive or negative. Two forces counteract each other to determine the sign. First, in settings with strong parties (like Iceland), the rebellion rate r will tend to be low, pushing towards a negative Δ_i. Second, the voting of outparty MPs may be more persuasive when it comes through rebellion than when it comes through obedience – rebellion is a stronger signal of the neighbor's support for the legislation. Chiang and Knight (2011) report empirical evidence for this idea in the context of newspaper endorsements of political candidates – endorsements are more effective when they go against the political slant of the newspaper. This force suggests that $p_r > p_l$, which pushes toward a positive Δ_i, with outparty exposure *increasing* party-line voting.

Next we solve for the pair-level effects of outparty exposure.

Proposition 2. *Δ_p is the pair-level outparty exposure effect, defined as the difference in compliance between neighboring and non-neighboring different-party pairs (as in our pair-level regression specification).*

(i)

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_p = {} & 2p_l(1-r)^2 + 2p_r r^2 + 2r - \frac{3}{2}r^2 - \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}(1-r)^4(1-p_l)^2 \\ & + (r^2 p_r - r - r^2)\left[\frac{1}{2}(1-r)^2(1-p_l) + \frac{1}{2}r(1-r) + \frac{1}{2}r^2 p_r\right] \\ & + \frac{1}{2}r(1-r)^3(1-p_l) + \frac{1}{2}r^2 p_r(1-r)^2(1-p_l)\end{aligned}$$

(ii) The first derivative of Δ_p with respect to p_l and p_r is positive.

(iii) Δ_p is weakly positive.

The second proposition establishes that, unlike the individual-level effect, the pair-level effect cannot be negative – a result that hinges on our assumption of no negative cue-taking. This confirms that, theoretically, the signs of the pair-level and individual-level effects need not coincide. Otherwise, this proposition shows that increases in both types of peer influence – influence from rebels (p_r) and from the obedient (p_l) – make the pair-level effect larger.

Proofs of Propositions.

PROOF OF *Proposition 1*:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_i &= P_{ld} - P_{ls} \\ &= (1-r)^2(1-p_l) + p_r r^2 + (1-r)r - 1 + r \\ &= 1 + r^2 - 2r - (1-r)^2 p_l + p_r r^2 + 2r - r^2 - 1 \\ &= p_r r^2 - p_l(1-r)^2\end{aligned}$$

PROOF OF *Proposition 2(i):*

Definition 1. (Pair Compliance Rate or PCR): The percentage of MP pairs that vote the same way.

- *PCR* for neighboring different-party pairs:

$$PCR_n = 2r(1-r) + 2p_l(1-r)^2 + 2p_r r^2 \tag{1}$$

- *PCR* for non-neighboring (separate) different-party pairs:
  - If both MPs have same-party neighbors
    - Note: We have $\frac{N^2}{4}$ different-party pairs, $\frac{N}{4}$ of which are neighbor pairs. So $\frac{N(N-1)}{4}$ are non-neighboring different-party pairs.
    - $\frac{1}{4}$ of different-party pairs; and as fraction of diff-party non-neighbor pairs: $\frac{N^2}{16} / \frac{N(N-1)}{4} = \frac{N}{4(N-1)} \to \frac{1}{4}$ for large N

$$\begin{aligned}PCR_s^{ss} &= 2P_{ls}(1-P_{ls}) \\ &= 2r(1-r)\end{aligned}$$

  - If one MP has a different-party neighbor:
    - $\frac{1}{2}$ of different-party pairs; and as a fraction of diff-party non-neighbor pairs:

$\frac{N^2}{8} / \frac{N(N-1)}{4} = \frac{N}{2(N-1)} \to \frac{1}{2}$ for large N

$$\begin{aligned} PCR_s^{sd} &= P_{ls}(1-P_{ld}) + (1-P_{ls})P_{ld} \\ &= (1-r)(1-P_{ld}) + rP_{ld} \\ &= 1 - P_{ld} - r + 2rP_{ld} \\ &= 1 - r + P_{ld}(2r-1) \end{aligned}$$

- If both MPs have different-party neighbors (but they aren't neighbors of each other):
  - $\frac{1}{4}$ of different-party pairs; and as a fraction of diff-party non-neighbor pairs: $\left(\frac{N^2}{16} - \frac{N}{4}\right) / \frac{N(N-1)}{4} = \frac{(N-4)}{4(N-1)} \to \frac{1}{4}$ for large N

$$PCR_s^{dd} = 2P_{ld}(1-P_{ld})$$

- Mean PCR for non-neighboring different-party pairs:

$$\begin{aligned} PCR_s &= \frac{1}{4}PCR_s^{ss} + \frac{1}{2}PCR_s^{sd} + \frac{1}{4}PCR_s^{dd} \\ &= \frac{1}{2}r(1-r) + \frac{1}{2}\left[1 - r + P_{ld}(2r-1)\right] + \frac{1}{2}P_{ld}(1-P_{ld}) \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_p &= PCR_n - PCR_s = (1) - (2) \\ &= 2r(1-r) + 2p_l(1-r)^2 + 2p_r r^2 - \frac{1}{2}r(1-r) - \frac{1}{2}\left[1 - r + P_{ld}(2r-1)\right] - \frac{1}{2}P_{ld}(1-P_{ld}) \\ &= 2p_l(1-r)^2 + 2p_r r^2 + 2r - 2r^2 - \frac{1}{2}r + \frac{1}{2}r^2 - \frac{1}{2}(1-r) - rP_{ld} + \frac{1}{2}P_{ld}^2 \\ &= 2p_l(1-r)^2 + 2p_r r^2 + 2r - \frac{3}{2}r^2 - \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}P_{ld}(P_{ld} - 2r) \\ &= 2p_l(1-r)^2 + 2p_r r^2 + 2r - \frac{3}{2}r^2 - \frac{1}{2} \\ &+ \frac{1}{2}\left[(1-r)^2(1-p_l) + r(1-r) + r^2 p_r\right]\left[(1-r)^2(1-p_l) + r - r^2 + r^2 p_r - 2r\right] \\ &= 2p_l(1-r)^2 + 2p_r r^2 + 2r - \frac{3}{2}r^2 - \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}(1-r)^4(1-p_l)^2 \\ &+ \frac{1}{2}(1-r)^2(1-p_l)(r^2 p_r - r - r^2) + \frac{1}{2}r(1-r)^3(1-p_l) + \frac{1}{2}r(1-r)(r^2 p_r - r - r^2) \\ &+ \frac{1}{2}r^2 p_r(1-r)^2(1-p_l) + \frac{1}{2}r^2 p_r(r^2 p_r - r - r^2) \end{aligned}$$

PROOF OF *Proposition 2(ii):*

- Differentiating Δ_p with respect to p_l

$$\begin{aligned}
&\implies 2(1-r^2)-(1-r)^4(1-p_l)-\frac{1}{2}(1-r^2)(r^2p_r-r-r^2)-\frac{1}{2}r(1-r)^3-\frac{1}{2}r^2p_r(1-r)^2\\
&=(1-r)^2\left[2-(1-r)^2(1-p_l)-\frac{1}{2}(r^2p_r-r-r^2)-\frac{1}{2}r(1-r)-\frac{1}{2}r^2p_r\right]\\
&=(1-r)^2\left[2-1+p_l+r^2p_l+2r-2rp_l-r^2p_r\right]\\
&=(1-r)^2\left[1+p_l(1+r^2-2r)+2r-r^2p_r\right]\\
&=(1-r)^2\left[1+p_l(1-r)^2+r(2-rp_r)\right]\\
&>0
\end{aligned}$$

given that $r, p_l, p_r \in (0,1)$.

- Differentiating Δ_p with respect to p_r

$$\begin{aligned}
&\implies 2r^2+\frac{1}{2}r^2(1-r)^2(1-p_l)+\frac{1}{2}r^3(1-r)+\frac{1}{2}r^2(1-r)^2(1-p_l)+r^4p_r-\frac{1}{2}r^3-\frac{1}{2}r^4\\
&=r^2\left[2+(1-r)^2(1-p_l)+\frac{1}{2}r(1-r)+r^2p_r-\frac{1}{2}r-\frac{1}{2}r^2\right]\\
&=r^2\left[2+1-p_l-r^2p_l-2r+2rp_l+r^2p_r\right]\\
&=r^2\left[2+(1-p_l)-2r(1-p_l)+r^2(p_r-p_l)\right]\\
&>0
\end{aligned}$$

given that $r, p_l, p_r \in (0,1)$ since

$$2+(1-p_l)-2r(1-p_l)+r^2(p_r-p_l)=2+(1-p_l)(1-2r)+r^2(p_r-p_l)$$

where the second and third terms are each at least equal to minus one.

PROOF OF *Proposition 2(iii):*

- Recall that $PCR_s=\frac{1}{4}PCR_s^{ss}+\frac{1}{2}PCR_s^{sd}+\frac{1}{4}PCR_s^{dd}$, and for $p_l=p_r=0$, note that $PCR_s=PCR_n=2r(1-r)$.

- It follows that $\Delta_p = 0$ whenever $p_l = p_r = 0$, for any $r \in (0,1)$.

- From *Proposition 2(ii)*, it follows that $\Delta_p > 0$ when $p_l, p_r \in (0,1)$.

E.2 Simulations

The theory demonstrates that positive pair-level effects of being seating neighbours need not imply that sitting next to other-party MPs reduces party-line voting. Despite this theoretical possibility, cue-taking only increases party discipline when $\frac{p_r}{p_l} > \left(\frac{1-r}{r}\right)^2$, and this condition is unlikely to hold in the Icelandic context, where r is close to zero, given that party discipline is high.

An alternative explanation for the disconnect between our pair-level and MP-level results is statistical: we may have more statistical power to detect peer influence in a pair-level specification than in an MP-level specification. We illustrate that this is the case with simulations. Our simulations follow the model in Section E.1 with only minor deviations, which we note. We take the following steps:

- We take the vector of actual votes of MPs,[2] and we call this variable $vote\_natural$. We interpret these votes as the votes MPs would take in the absence of peer influence. In reality, these votes *have* been influenced, but since we estimate only small peer effects, these votes still approximate the main features of votes made in the absence of influence (for example, the rebellion rate, a key input into the theory, will be similar).

- We re-randomize the seating 50 times.[3] We use each of these counterfactual seating arrangements to define counterfactual peers, and we allow these peers to influence each MP's vote.

- For each random draw s of the seating arrangement, we simulate peer effects, leaving us with a final vector of votes, $vote\_influenced_s$. We assume that only different-party neighbors can influence an MP's vote, and that they do so with probability p, which is the key parameter that we vary across simulations. p is the parallel to p_l and p_r in the model. The

[2] These votes are exactly those used for our main analysis.

[3] As with our approach to randomization inference, we replicate the exact random process by which the *Althingi* assigns MPs to seats.

simplifying differences here are that (i) we set $p_l = p_r$, and (ii) we allow neighboring MPs to persuade one another at the same time, meaning that the two neighboring MPs could swap votes (although this happens only with low probability when p is small). A third difference adds realism: we allow an MP to partially influence their neighbor, switching the neighbor's vote part of the way towards their own vote.

- In detail, we simulate the process of influence as follows:
  - We set a given MP's $vote\_influenced = vote\_natural$ whenever the MP has no different-party neighbors to influence them (which depends on the particular seating arrangement s), or whenever all different-party neighbors have the same natural vote as the MP (which depends on both the seating arrangement s and the specific vote in question).
  - When an MP has one different-party neighbor, we allow the MP's vote to be influenced by that neighbor with probability p. When an MP has two different-party neighbors, we first randomly select one of the two neighbors to be the influencer, and then we again allow the MP's vote to be influenced by that neighbor with probability p.
  - When an MP is successfully influenced by a neighbor, we replace the MP's $vote\_influenced$ with a vote that is closer to the vote of the neighbor. We do so by considering votes in order of the strength of support: from yes, to absent, to abstain, to no. For any given instance of influence, we find the votes that are closer or equal to the influencer, and we randomly select one of these votes to become the influenced MP's new vote. For example, suppose that MP a with natural vote "yes" influences MP b with natural vote "no." In this case, we would set MP b's $vote\_influenced$ to "abstain" with one-third probability, to "absent" with one-third probability, and to "yes" with one-third probability.
- After simulating the influence process for the entire vector of natural votes, for each of seating arrangement s, and for different learning parameters p, we have a set of vectors of simulated votes, $vote\_influenced_{sp}$ – one vector for each of the 50 seating draws, for each

possible parameter p. With the votes simulated, we collapse the data to the pair-session and MP-session-level, recreating our main outcome variables.

We re-estimate contemporaneous effects using both the pair-level and MP-level specifications (specification 1 and 3) using the vectors of simulated votes, and with the neighbor variables defined as per the seating arrangement draw s associated with the vector of simulated votes. For each parameter p, we re-estimate both specifications 50 times, once for each re-randomized seating arrangement. For simplicity, we use only the contested votes in which the share of MPs voting the modal vote is less than the median (as in Tables 2 and A26, Columns 1 and 2), and we use only the Similarity outcome for the pair-level effects, and the Rebel Rate outcome for the MP-level effects.

We summarize the results of the estimation in the table below, reporting for each value of p: (i) the mean $\hat{\gamma}_2$ (the cross-party pair-level neighbor effect), (ii) the percentage of the 50 counterfactual seating arrangements for which we can reject the null that $\gamma_2 = 0$ at the 5% level (a measure of statistical power in the pair-level specification), (iii) the mean $\hat{\beta}$ (the MP-level effect of other-party neighbors), and (iv) the percentage of the 50 counterfactual seating arrangements for which we can reject the null that $\beta = 0$ at the 5% level (a measure of statistical power in the MP-level specification). For comparison, we also include the estimates and p-values using the real data and seating arrangement. Table C2 reveals several key findings:

1. For a large enough p, positive pair-level effects come hand-in-hand with positive MP-level effects on rebellion – i.e. we are not in the theoretical case where cross-party peer influence *increases* party-line voting.

2. For any given p, we have considerably more power to detect pair-level effects than MP-level effects. Given (1), this is not because we are in the theoretical case where general effects are null or of opposite sign.

3. Estimated pair-level effects are roughly half as large as the underlying structural parameter p – the fact that they are smaller is natural, since whenever MP pairs would vote the same in the absence of influence, there is no scope for neighbors to vote more similarly than non-neighbors. Taking the model literally, our pair-level effects estimated on the real data are consistent with a probability of influence equal to two percent.

Table C2: Estimated Effects Using Simulated Votes With Known Peer Influence

Influence Probability	Pair Effects $\hat{\gamma}_2$	Individual Effects $\hat{\beta}$
Actual	.0096	-.00036
	$p < 0.001$	$p = 0.66$
1%	.00546	.000614
	38%	8%
2%	.0106	.00116
	90%	28%
3%	.0157	.00172
	100%	40%
5%	.0256	.00283
	100%	88%
7%	.0352	.00392
	100%	98%
10%	.0487	.00564
	100%	100%
15%	.069	.00853
	100%	100%
20%	.0866	.0112
	100%	100%

Notes: The table reports estimates of $\hat{\gamma}_2$ from the pair-session-level specification 1 with the Compliance outcome, and estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ from the MP-session-level specification 3 with the Rebel Rate outcome. The first row reports the estimates and dyadic-robust p-values when using the real data and seating assignment (repeated from column 1 of Table 2 and column 2 of Table A26). The remaining rows show the results from simulations, parameterized with the probability of influence ranging from 1% to 20% (far-left column). In each cell, the top row is the mean $\hat{\gamma}_2$ and mean $\hat{\beta}$ from across the 50 simulated counterfactual seating arrangements. The second row is the percentage of the 50 simulations for which we reject the null hypothesis that $\gamma_2 = 0$ and the null hypothesis that $\beta = 0$ at the 5% level.

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